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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, 
 
Appellant, Sandra Walton, was fired by the Mental Health 
Association of Southeastern Pennsylvania ("MHASP") and 
sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. S 12101 et seq.  (1994), claiming 
harassment, disparate treatment, and failure to 
accommodate. The District Court granted summary 
judgment for MHASP on these claims and denied Walton's 
motion to amend the complaint to add a discrimination 
claim based on her obesity as a perceived disability. Walton 
now challenges these decisions. We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
The facts are generally uncontested and are accurately 
set forth in the District Court's Memorandum. See Walton 
v. Mental Health Assoc. of Southeastern Pa., No. CIV.A.96- 
5682, 1997 WL 717053 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 1997). We will 
summarize. 
 
Walton worked for MHASP, an advocacy organization for 
people with mental illness, from January 1990 until she 
was terminated on January 6, 1994. She was the Director 
of Advocacy Consumer Training for New Opportunities 
("ACT NOW"), a program within MHASP that provided 
employment training and job placement for mental health 
services consumers. As Director, Walton was responsible 
for managing the program and supervising its staff. In 
1992, Walton was assigned a new supervisor, Carmen 
Meek. The relationship between the two was not good. 
 
Like approximately eighty percent of MHASP's employees, 
Walton is a mental health services consumer. Specifically, 
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she suffers from depression. As a result, she was 
hospitalized six times between March 1990 and December 
1993. Because of her illness, Walton was absent twenty-one 
days in 1990, forty days in 1991, fifty days in 1992, and 
fourteen and a half days in 1993 before taking leave on 
October 26, 1993. On that date, Walton was hospitalized 
for her illness, and she did not return to work before she 
was terminated in January 1994. MHASP policy provides 
eighteen days of sick leave per year. 
 
For over a year before Walton was terminated, the results 
of the ACT NOW program -- measured by actual job 
placement -- had declined significantly. ACT NOW was 
funded through grants from the Office of Vocational 
Rehabilitation and the City of Philadelphia. The drop in job 
placements led MHASP executives to fear for the continued 
sponsorship and existence of the program. 
 
Upon being hospitalized in October 1993, Walton 
requested a leave of absence without pay. MHASP's Human 
Resources Manager granted her request in a letter in which 
he stated: "In the near future would you please let me know 
the expected duration of your leave. It is our policy that a 
leave without pay should not exceed 6 months." Walton 
wrote MHASP a letter indicating that her doctor did not 
want her to return to work until November 22 and that she 
intended to be back on that date. She did not return on 
that date. On December 30, Walton's doctor wrote MHASP 
to inform them that Walton had regressed and that she 
should not return to work for several weeks. On January 4, 
1994, Walton notified MHASP that she would report to 
work on January 10. On January 6, 1994, Walton was 
terminated. The above facts are undisputed as are all 
others material to the District Court's summary judgment 
ruling. 
 
Walton filed a discrimination complaint with the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission which, in turn, 
lodged it with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission. The Human Relations Commission notified 
Walton that it had found "No Cause" in its investigation of 
her complaint, and she requested a Right-to-Sue Notice 
from the EEOC. Walton then sued MHASP. 
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II. 
 
Walton's first claim is that the District Court erred by 
denying her petition to amend the complaint to add a claim 
of discrimination based on the perceived disability of 
obesity. We review the Court's decision for abuse of 
discretion. See Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d 
911, 916 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
When a complaint is not amended within the time that 
amendments are allowed as a matter of course, a party may 
amend its complaint "by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given 
when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). 
Nevertheless, a trial court may consider whether the 
amendment would be futile. See F.D.I.C. v. Bathgate, 27 
F.3d 850, 874 (3d Cir. 1994). Here, the District Court held 
that Walton's proposed new claim failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. See Walton, 1997 WL 
717053, at *15. 
 
The ADA defines disability as "A) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the 
major life activities . . . ; B) a record of such an impairment; 
or C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 
U.S.C. S 12102(2). Walton argues that MHASP perceived her 
as disabled because she is obese, and that this claim, 
therefore, falls under the third prong of the disability 
definition. 
 
We have not recognized a cause of action against an 
employer who discriminates against an employee because it 
perceives the employee as disabled by obesity. Nor need we 
do so now because Walton has not claimed that MHASP 
discriminated against her because it perceived her as 
disabled by some impairment that substantially limits one of 
her major life activities.  
 
Although the ADA does not define "major life activities," 
see Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996), 
an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity 
when she is "[u]nable to perform a major life activity that 
the average person in the general population can perform" 
or is "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner 
or duration under which [she] can perform a particular 
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major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or 
duration under which the average person in the general 
population can perform that same major life activity." 29 
C.F.R. S 1630.2(j). 
 
Major life activities include "functions such as caring for 
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, 
speaking, breathing, learning, and working." Id. S 1630.2(i). 
Walton asserts that MHASP did not release a promotional 
video in which she appeared because she was too obese. 
She apparently argues that, if MHASP refused to publish 
the video for this reason, it must have perceived her as 
substantially limited in her ability to work because 
appearing in the video was a part of her job. However, 
"[w]ith respect to the major life activity of working[, t]he 
term substantially limits means significantly restricted in 
the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range 
of jobs in various classes as compared to the average 
person having comparable training, skills and abilities." Id. 
S 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Furthermore, "[t]he inability to perform a 
single, particular job does not constitute a substantial 
limitation in the major life activity of working." Id. 
 
Even if MHASP did cancel the video because of Walton's 
appearance (a fact MHASP disputes), her claim fails. By 
asserting that MHASP prevented her from performing a 
single minor aspect of her job, Walton simply has not 
claimed that MHASP perceived her as substantially limited 
in the major life activity of working under this standard. 
Nor is there any indication that MHASP perceived her 
obesity as limiting her other major life activities. 
 
Finally, Walton argues that the District Court first asked 
her to amend the complaint and then ignored the petition 
to amend once filed. See Appellant's Brief at 26-27. This is 
incorrect. The District Court did refer to Walton's delay in 
petitioning to amend. It did not, however, ignore the 
petition. Nor did the Court deny the petition because 
Walton delayed. Rather, the District Court addressed 
Walton's attempted amendment in the order granting 
summary judgment. It denied the petition because Walton 
failed therein to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. Walton was not prejudiced by the Court's decision 
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to deny the petition to amend,1 and the Court did not abuse 
its discretion. 
 
III. 
 
Walton also appeals the District Court's conclusion that 
she did not produce sufficient evidence of an objectively 
hostile work environment to make out a prima facie case of 
harassment. The ADA states that "[n]o covered entity shall 
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability 
because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . . 
[the] terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 
U.S.C. S 12112(a). We have not previously determined 
whether the ADA creates a cause of action for harassment 
under this section. The District Court proceeded on the 
assumption that a claim for a hostile workplace -- i.e., 
harassment -- could be stated under the ADA, see Walton, 
1997 WL 717053, at *12, and the parties on appeal have 
followed suit. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that language in Title VII 
that is almost identical to the above language in the ADA 
creates a cause of action for a hostile work environment. 
See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180, 
109 S. Ct. 2363, 2374 (1989). In addition, we have 
recognized that: 
 
       [i]n the context of employment discrimination, the ADA, 
       ADEA and Title VII all serve the same purpose--to 
       prohibit discrimination in employment against 
       members of certain classes. Therefore, it follows that 
       the methods and manner of proof under one statute 
       should inform the standards under the others as well. 
       Indeed, we routinely use Title VII and ADEA caselaw 
       interchangeably, when there is no material difference 
       in the question being addressed. 
 
Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 
1995). This framework indicates that a cause of action for 
harassment exists under the ADA. However, like other  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Walton also requested amendment in order to assert a harassment 
claim. The District Court treated this claim as having been stated in the 
original complaint. See Part III, infra. 
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courts,2 we will assume this cause of action without 
confirming it because Walton did not show that she can 
state a claim. 
 
A claim for harassment based on disability, like one 
under Title VII, would require a showing that: 1) Walton is 
a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA; 2) 
she was subject to unwelcome harassment; 3) the 
harassment was based on her disability or a request for an 
accommodation; 4) the harassment was sufficiently severe 
or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and 
to create an abusive working environment; and 5) that 
MHASP knew or should have known of the harassment and 
failed to take prompt effective remedial action. See 
McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558, 
563 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Vendetta v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 
No. CIV.A. 97-4838, 1998 WL 575111, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 
8, 1998).3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Many courts have proceeded on the assumption that the ADA creates 
a cause of action for a hostile work environment but avoided confirming 
that the claim exists. See, e.g., Wallin v. Minnesota Dept. of 
Corrections, 
153 F.3d 681, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 
U.S.L.W. 
3410 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1998) (No. 98-1007) ("We will assume, without 
deciding, that such a cause of action exists."); Moritz v. Frontier 
Airlines, 
Inc., 147 F.3d 784, 788 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Although we are uncertain 
whether such a cause of action exists, . . . [plaintiff] has failed to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination"); McConathy v. Dr. 
Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that 
various district courts have assumed the claim's existence and assuming 
its existence in order to dispense with appeal but stating that "[t]his 
case 
should not be cited for the proposition that the Fifth Circuit recognizes 
or rejects an ADA cause of action based on hostile environment 
harassment"). Our District Courts, likewise, have presumed the claim's 
existence. See, e.g., Vendetta v. Bell Atlantic Corp., No. CIV.A. 97-4838, 
1998 WL 575111 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 8, 1998) (noting that because the 
Supreme Court has read a cause of action for harassment into Title VII, 
the same is appropriate under the ADA). At least one circuit has 
considered the claim without disavowing it. See Keever v. City of 
Middletown, 145 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 407 
(1998). Indeed, we have not discovered any case holding that the claim 
cannot be asserted under the ADA. 
 
3. Although the District Court did not mention the fifth element, it 
correctly found that Walton had failed to meet others, and thus its 
omission was harmless. 
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To prove an "abusive work environment" under Title VII, 
the environment must be shown to be objectively hostile or 
abusive, and the plaintiff must have perceived it as a 
hostile or abusive environment. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22, 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993). Walton 
would not need to prove that she suffered injury or that her 
psychological well-being was seriously affected. See id., 114 
S. Ct. at 371. She would, however, be called upon to show 
that the harassment was "sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an 
abusive working environment." Id. at 21, 114 S. Ct. at 370 
(citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S. 
Ct. 2399, 2405 (1986)). To judge whether such an 
environment is hostile or abusive, we must consider all 
the circumstances, including "the frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically 
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; 
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's 
work performance." Id. at 23, 114 S. Ct. at 371. Walton 
simply has not demonstrated that the asserted harassment 
was pervasive or severe enough to meet the Harris 
standard. 
 
Walton asserts that various comments and actions by her 
supervisor, Meek, amount to harassment,4  and she argues 
that the District Court resolved disputed material factual 
issues to rule on this claim at the summary judgment level. 
We disagree. 
 
Although it is clear that the relationship between Walton 
and Meek was poor, Walton has not asserted facts that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The primary actions pointed to by Walton are: (1) Meek told Walton 
that she would be fired if she did not attend the graduation ceremony for 
ACT NOW (Walton is agoraphobic and later received permission not to 
attend the graduation from one of Meek's superiors); (2) Meek once told 
Walton she was "manic-depressive"; (3) Meek called her ten days 
consecutively when she was first hospitalized, asking each day when she 
would be returning to work (this upset Walton to the point that her 
doctor asked her to request that Meek stop calling); (4) Meek stated in 
her deposition that she believes persons with mental illness have 
impaired judgment when they are suffering from their illness; and (5) 
Meek forbade Walton's staff from speaking with her about the ACT NOW 
program while she was hospitalized. 
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would allow a reasonable jury to find that Meek harassed 
her because of her disability. See, e.g., Uhl v. Zalk Josephs 
Fabricators, Inc., 121 F.3d 1133, 1137 (7th Cir. 1997) ("A 
personality conflict doesn't ripen into an ADA claim simply 
because one of the parties has a disability."). The fact that 
Meek's behavior toward Walton may have been offensive 
does not indicate that it was based on Walton's disability. 
Finally, we agree with the District Court's conclusion that, 
"[a]ll of these alleged incidents -- considered both 
individually and together -- fall far short of meeting the 
Harris standard." Walton, 1997 WL 717053, at *14. 
 
IV. 
 
Walton's disparate treatment claim asserted that MHASP 
fired her while she was on leave because of her disability. 
She now argues that she presented enough evidence to 
raise an inference of pretext regarding MHASP's stated 
reason for firing her, and thus to avoid summary judgment. 
The McDonnell Douglas Title VII burden shifting rules apply 
to claims of discriminatory treatment under the ADA. See 
Lawrence v. National Westminster Bank N.J., 98 F.3d 61, 68 
& n.7 (3d Cir. 1996). To establish a prima facie case of 
disparate treatment, Walton "must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that (1) [she] belongs to a 
protected class; (2) [she] was qualified for the position; (3) 
[she] was dismissed despite being qualified; and (4) [she] 
was ultimately replaced by a person sufficiently outside the 
protected class to create an inference of discrimination." Id. 
at 68. The District Court assumed that Walton had stated 
a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. 5  See 
Walton, 1997 WL 717053, at *5. 
 
Once the employee has established a prima facie case, 
"the burden of production shifts to the employer to 
`articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the employee's rejection.' " See Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. MHASP argued that Walton was not "qualified" under the ADA due to 
her significant absences and therefore could not state a prima facie 
discrimination claim. The District Court held that whether attendance 
was essential to the job was a "hotly contested" fact in this case and 
therefore construed the question in Walton's favor. 
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759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973)). 
The District Court determined that MHASP had articulated 
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason when it claimed that 
Walton's failure to provide ACT NOW with the necessary 
leadership and her extensive absences had led it to fear for 
the program's future and therefore to dismiss Walton. See 
Walton, 1997 WL 717053, at *6. 
 
Because MHASP stated a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory" 
reason for its action, Walton, to defeat summary judgment, 
had to "point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, 
from which a fact finder could reasonably either (1) 
disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or 
(2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was 
more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of 
the employer's action." Lawrence, 98 F.3d at 66. These 
options enable a plaintiff to survive summary judgment, 
without direct evidence, by producing "sufficient evidence to 
raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer's 
proffered reasons were not its true reasons for the 
challenged employment action."6  Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996) (en 
banc). 
 
The defendant's intent in dismissing the plaintiff is a 
factual question. See Chippolini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 
F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir. 1987) (en banc). Therefore, if Walton 
can point to evidence that calls into question MHASP's 
intent, she "raises an issue of material fact which, if 
genuine, is sufficient to preclude summary judgment." Id. A 
dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "if the evidence 
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). 
 
The District Court concluded that Walton had not offered 
any evidence from which a reasonable jury couldfind that 
MHASP's proffered reason for terminating Walton was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Of course, at trial, the plaintiff maintains the burden to persuade the 
jury that the reason was pretextual and that the real reason for the 
employer's action was discrimination. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. 
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 n.4, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 n.4 (1993). 
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pretextual. See Walton, 1997 WL 717053, at *7-10. Walton 
argues that she produced both direct and indirect evidence 
that MHASP's stated reasons were pretextual. She did not, 
and we will affirm the District Court. 
 
A. Direct Evidence of Pretext 
 
Walton points to evidence that the high attrition rate in 
the ACT NOW program, which MHASP claimed showed a 
declining level of productivity in the program,"had long 
been known to defendant," Appellant's Brief at 42, and was 
due to such uncontrollable factors as the program 
participants' "unreasonable expectations, insubordination, 
absenteeism and drug abuse." Id. She asserts that she had 
no control over the attrition rate. This argument is not 
convincing. MHASP's concern with the program's declining 
success rate and its reliance on the faltering results in its 
decision to dismiss Walton was reasonable as long as 
earlier program participants were faced with similar 
difficulties. Walton did not claim that they were not. 
 
Walton notes that it was Meek who pointed out 
numerous faults in the program and claims that her 
veracity is in doubt because she is the person who 
purportedly harassed Walton. However, MHASP's 
knowledge of ACT NOW's faltering results and of Walton's 
significant absences did not depend on Meek's reports, and 
Walton has not suggested that the data MHASP relied upon 
was incorrect.7 
 
B. Indirect Evidence of Pretext 
 
Walton asserts that the timing and circumstances 
surrounding her dismissal are sufficient to support an 
inference that MHASP's stated reasons for terminating her 
are pretextual. Factors including "the timing of an 
employee's dismissal, and the employer's treatment of the 
employee could raise an inference of pretext which would 
make summary judgment for the employer inappropriate." 
Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Co., 996 F.2d 632, 638-39 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Walton's assertion that MHASP cannot claim that it fired her for her 
absences because her absences were largely a result of MHASP's abusive 
treatment is unsupported by the facts. See Part III, supra. 
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Walton cites White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 
56 (3d Cir. 1989), for authority that the circumstances 
surrounding her discharge may be sufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact and preclude summary 
judgment. White was dismissed when he was three months 
short of serving thirty years, upon which he would have 
been entitled to greater retirement benefits and the option 
to retire at a younger age. We decided that these 
circumstances indicated that White was discriminated 
against based on his age. However, the rationale behind 
White was rejected by the Supreme Court in Hazen Paper 
Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993). In 
Hazen, the Court considered a claim under the ADEA by an 
employee who had been fired just before his pension would 
have vested. In holding that the employer did not violate 
the ADEA by firing the employee to prevent his pension 
from vesting, the Court emphasized that a firing that may 
be wrongful in one sense (to purposefully avoid paying 
benefits, for example) is not necessarily wrongful under the 
ADEA (or, in Walton's case, the ADA) "unless the protected 
trait actually motivates the employer's decision." Id. at 610, 
611-12, 113 S. Ct. at 1706, 1707-08. Therefore, our 
inference in White that a wrongful firing that occurred 
because an employee was about to gain increased pension 
benefits indicated a wrongful firing based on age was 
unfounded. Hazen teaches that we must not infer a 
particular type of discrimination from circumstances that 
merely indicate a wrongful firing of some sort. That is just 
what Walton is asking us to do. 
 
To consider timing and/or employee treatment in relation 
to a dismissal as evidence of discrimination, there must be 
some logical connection between the timing or treatment 
and the possibility of the particular discrimination at issue. 
For example, in Josey, 996 F.2d at 632, a company owned 
by seven white shareholder employees adopted a new 
preference for hiring and maintaining shareholders in the 
midst of unrest following the promotion of a black 
nonshareholder supervisor ahead of a white shareholder. 
We found that the timing of the adoption of the new 
company policy preferring shareholders, together with facts 
that indicated racial prejudice by at least one shareholder, 
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was sufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether the 
action was racially motivated. See id. at 640-41. 
 
Walton asserts that MHASP's hiring of her replacement a 
month before she was notified that she had beenfired 
showed that the reasons it gave for her dismissal were 
pretextual. Although she was fired while on leave and was 
not given notice that she had been replaced until she was 
about to return to work, it would be wrong to infer from 
this that MHASP's decision to dismiss her was based on her 
disability. Here, nothing connects the timing of the 
dismissal or the related circumstances with a 
discriminatory motive. Rather, the reverse is true. Walton 
was let go during her longest extended absence. This would 
clearly have brought any concerns that MHASP previously 
had regarding her ability to do her job to a head and 
increased the pressure on the association to replace her. 
 
V. 
 
Finally, Walton argues that the District Court erred by 
holding that her proposed accommodation (being left on 
extended leave) created an undue burden on MHASP. 
Under the ADA, discrimination includes: "not making 
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or 
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with 
a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless[the 
employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business 
of such [employer]." 42 U.S.C. S 12112(b)(5)(A). An undue 
hardship entails "significant difficulty or expense in, or 
resulting from, the provision of the accommodation." 29 
C.F.R. S 1630, App. S 1630.2(p). 
 
The circuits disagree whether the burdens of production 
and persuasion on the issues of reasonable accommodation 
and undue burden are properly placed on the plaintiff or 
the defendant, or are divided between them. See Borkowski 
v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 136-37 (2d Cir. 
1995) (recounting the various approaches). We now, like the 
 
                                13 
  
District Court, "chart a middle course," id. at 137, and 
adopt the Borkowski approach:8  
 
       First, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she 
       is otherwise qualified; if an accommodation is needed, 
       the plaintiff must show, as part of her burden of 
       persuasion, that an effective accommodation exists 
       that would render her otherwise qualified. On the issue 
       of reasonable accommodation, the plaintiff bears only 
       the burden of identifying an accommodation, the costs 
       of which, facially, do not clearly exceed its benefits. 
       These two requirements placed on the plaintiff will 
       permit district courts to grant summary judgments for 
       defendants in cases in which the plaintiff 's proposal is 
       either clearly ineffective or outlandishly costly. 
 
Id. at 139. 
 
Following a prima facie showing by the plaintiff that a 
reasonable accommodation exists which would make her 
qualified, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove either 
that the accommodation is unreasonable or that it creates 
an undue hardship for the defendant. See id. at 138. These 
two options before the defendant effectively "merge" 
because "in practice meeting the burden of nonpersuasion 
on the reasonableness of the accommodation and 
demonstrating that the accommodation imposes an undue 
hardship amount to the same thing." Id. 
 
This distribution of burdens is both fair and efficient. The 
employee knows whether her disability can be 
accommodated in a manner that will allow her to 
successfully perform her job. The employer, however, holds 
the information necessary to determine whether the 
proposed accommodation will create an undue burden for 
it. See id. at 137. Thus, the approach simply places the 
burden on the party holding the evidence with respect to 
the particular issue. 
 
Walton asserts that MHASP should have accommodated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We previously indicated, in dictum, our preference for the Borkowski 
approach. See Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 1996) (a case 
under the Rehabilitation Act). 
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her by continuing her leave of absence without firing her.9 
The District Court concluded that Walton had made a facial 
showing that unpaid leave was potentially a reasonable 
accommodation for her sickness by introducing the letter 
with which MHASP accepted her request for unpaid leave. 
See Walton, 1997 WL 717053, at *11. Addressing MHASP's 
decision to end its grant of unpaid leave, however, the 
Court reasoned that the "same evidence that demonstrates 
the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing plaintiff 
. . . also demonstrates that the accommodation that 
plaintiff seeks [continuation of her leave] created an undue 
burden for the organization." Id. at *12. Therefore, the 
Court held, MHASP had produced "sufficient 
uncontroverted evidence to meet the burden of 
demonstrating that the requested accommodation, although 
possible, was not reasonable." Id. 
 
We will affirm because Walton's requested 
accommodation -- continued leave -- would have created 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Walton originally alleged that MHASP failed to reasonably 
accommodate her on a number of other occasions. She raises only this 
instance on appeal. 
 
In addition, she now argues that she could have been rehired "in a less 
critical position than Director." In her reply brief, Walton further 
extends 
this argument by asserting that, because MHASP hired her replacement 
without telling her, it failed to make a "good faith effort to communicate 
with her regarding necessary and available accommodations." 
 
MHASP responds that this argument is untimely because it was not 
asserted by the plaintiff before the District Court. Walton originally 
complained that "[d]efendant failed to reasonably accommodate 
plaintiff 's request for a leave of absence without pay by violating its 
own 
stated policy respecting the duration of such absences." (The proposed 
amended complaint did not alter this claim.) The District Court declined 
to consider the reassignment issue because Walton did not raise the 
issue in her complaint. See Walton, 1997 WL 717053, at *10 n.12. This 
was not in error. 
 
As to Walton's attempt to raise the issue before us,"absent exceptional 
circumstances, an issue not raised in the district court will not be heard 
on appeal." Altman v. Altman, 653 F.2d 755, 758 (3d Cir. 1981) (citation 
omitted). In exceptional circumstances or when manifest injustice would 
otherwise result, public interest can require that the issue be heard. See 
id. This case does not present such circumstances. 
 
                                15 
  
an undue burden on MHASP. Reasonable accommodations 
are "[m]odifications or adjustments to the work 
environment, or to the manner or circumstances under 
which the position held or desired is customarily 
performed, that enable a qualified individual with a 
disability to perform the essential functions of that 
position." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). Although unpaid leave 
supplementing regular sick and personal days might, under 
other facts, represent a reasonable accommodation, an 
employer does not have to allow leave of this type to the 
extent that MHASP had already granted it to Walton. A 
blanket requirement that an employer allow such leave is 
beyond the scope of the ADA when the absent employee 
simply will not be performing the essential functions of her 
position. 
 
Walton attempts to use MHASP's past grants of unpaid 
leave against it by arguing that these instances show that 
the leave was a reasonable accommodation. Here, Holbrook 
v. City of Alpharetta, Georgia, 112 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir. 
1997), is informative. In Holbrook, the city accommodated a 
visually-impaired police detective for a significant period of 
time with respect to essential functions of his job which he 
could not perform without assistance. The court held that 
the city's decision to cease the accommodations did not 
violate the ADA because the city's original accommodations 
exceeded the level that the law required. See id. at 1528. 
Similarly, the unpaid leave granted to Walton exceeded the 
requirement of reasonable accommodation under the ADA, 
and MHASP's decision to discontinue the accommodation 
does not give her a cause of action against it. 
 
VI. 
 
In sum, Walton has not convinced us that the District 
Court erred by granting MHASP's motion for summary 
judgment on her claims of harassment, disparate 
treatment, and failure to accommodate. Nor has she shown 
that the District Court erred by not allowing her to amend 
her complaint. Accordingly, we will affirm. 
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